UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-10-2017

State v. Hanson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44023

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hanson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44023" (2017). Not Reported. 3200.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3200

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 44023
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO.
v.
)
CR 2006-14940
)
OLAF HANSON,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 7
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hanson’s Motion To Suppress ........................ 7
A. Introduction

........................................................................................................... 7

B. Standard Of Review .....................................................................................................
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hanson’s Motion To
Suppress Because Mr. Hanson Did Not Voluntarily Consent
To The Search ........................................................................................................... 8
D. This Court Has An Adequate Record To Review This Issue On Appeal,
Even Without The Traffic Stop Video ...................................................................... 19
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 22
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................................. 23

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)..................................................................................... 13
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) ........................................................................ 10, 12
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) ...................................................................................... 14
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ............................................................. 8, 10, 12
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)......................................................................... 16, 17
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)..................................................................................... 18
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)....................................................................................... 13
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829 (2002) ..........................................................................................8
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ...................................................................... 10, 12
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) ................................................................................ 16
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) .................................................................................... 16
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)..................................................................... 8, 9
State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703 (2012) ................................................................................... 13
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245 (1990)................................................................................. 14
State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416 (Ct. App. 1996) ............................................................................ 20
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405 (2012) .................................................................................... 7, 8
State v. Dias, No. 43495, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 725, 2016 WL 5864622, at *2–3
(Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2016) .......................................................................................................... 18
State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214 (2014).................................................................................. 20, 21
State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2001) .............................................................................. 10
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005).........................................................................13
State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791 (2003) ........................................................................................8
ii

State v. Hanson, No. 44023, Order Granting Motion to Remand and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule (Oct. 28, 2016) .........................................................................................................5
State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883 (2000) ........................................................................................20
State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568 (Ct. App. 2014) ...........................................................................7
State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91 (Ct. App. 1984) ............................................................................8
State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94 (Ct. App. 2006) ....................................................................... 8, 9
State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747 (Ct. App. 1997) ........................................................................... 20
State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77 (1994) ........................................................................................... 20
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680 (Ct. App. 2011) ...................................................................9
State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817 (2004) ......................................................................................16
State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................................................. 16, 17
State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489 (Ct. App. 1999).................................................................. 20, 21
State v. Silva,134 Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 2000) .............................................................................18
State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482 (2007) ..................................................................... 8, 9, 10, 13, 19
State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2007) ........................................................................ 10
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848 (2001) ...........................................................................................9
State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230 (2005) ...........................................................................................7
United States v. Jones, U.S. 400 (2012) ..................................................................................... 17
United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2010) ................................................. 18
United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2002).........................................................18

Statutes
I.C. § 18-3316 .............................................................................................................................1
I.C. § 19-2514 .............................................................................................................................1

iii

Rules
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 38 ............................................................................................5
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion ...................................................................................................4

Additional Authorities
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.10(b) (4th ed. 2016) .......................................9
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(a) (5th ed. 2016)............................................9

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged Olaf Hanson with five offenses arising from the search of his vehicle
during a traffic stop. Mr. Hanson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search,
arguing his consent to search was involuntary. The district court denied his motion. Mr. Hanson
went to trial, and the jury found him guilty. Eventually, after Mr. Hanson obtained postconviction relief, Mr. Hanson appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. He now
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2006, the State charged Mr. Hanson with unlawful possession of a firearm, a felony, in
violation of I.C. § 18-3316, and four misdemeanor offenses for possession of a controlled
substance under three ounces, possession of drug paraphernalia, providing false information to
law enforcement, and driving while suspended. (R., pp.60–62; see also R., pp.147–50 (Amended
Information).) These charges arose out of a traffic stop and subsequent search of a vehicle driven
by Mr. Hanson. (See R., pp.19–21 (probable cause affidavit).) This search was premised on
Mr. Hanson’s consent. (See R., p.19.) The State also charged Mr. Hanson with the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.62–63.) Mr. Hanson was
represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender. (See, e.g., R., pp.34–35, 40–
41, 219–20)
Mr. Hanson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle.
(R., pp.72–75.) He contested his alleged consent to search the car. (R., pp.72–75.) The district
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court held three hearings on the motion. (R., pp.80–81, 84–86, 87–90; Tr. Vol. I, 1 p.9, L.1–p.14,
L.4, p.17, L.1–p.23, L.25; Tr. Vol. II, p.3, L.1–p.34, L.15.) The district court admitted
Defendant’s Exhibit A, a video recording of the traffic stop, and the police officer briefly
testified. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.6–8, p.20, L.1–p.21, L.13.) The district court also considered the
police officer’s testimony from the preliminary hearing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.3, Ls.3–8; See Tr. Vol. III,
p.2, L.2–p.40, L.22.) At the third and final hearing on the motion, the district court ruled
Mr. Hanson voluntarily consented to the search. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.25, L.14–p.34, L.3 (district
court’s oral factual findings and legal conclusions).) The district court denied the motion to
suppress. (Tr. Vol. II, p.33, L.22–p.34, L.3.)
Mr. Hanson went to trial. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.26, L.1–p.356, L.11.) After jury
selection, and outside the presence of the jury, Mr. Hanson pled guilty to two of the four
misdemeanor offenses for providing false information to law enforcement and driving while
suspended. (Tr. Vol. I, p.117, L.14–p.123, L.25.) The district court accepted his guilty pleas.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.124, Ls.1–3.) The trial would proceed on the remaining three charges: unlawful
possession of a firearm and two misdemeanor offenses for possession of a controlled substance
and possession of drug paraphernalia. In addition, for unlawful possession of a firearm,
Mr. Hanson stipulated to the fact that he knew he had been convicted of a felony. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.114, L.8–p.117, L.13; see also R., p.164 (Jury Instruction 10A on stipulation).) After a two-day
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There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains two of the three
motion to suppress hearings, the jury trial, sentencing hearing, and probation
violation/disposition hearings. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the third motion to
suppress hearing, held on January 3, 2007. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the
preliminary hearing, held on August 8, 2006, the rider review hearing, held on June 12, 2008,
and another copy of the sentencing hearing, held on January 3, 2008.
2

jury trial in early January of 2007, the jury found Mr. Hanson guilty of all three offenses.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.297, L.13–p.298, L.10; R., pp.181–82.)
The district court then proceeded to Part II of the trial for the persistent violator
enhancement. (Tr. Vol. I, p.299, L.1–p.356, L.11.) Mr. Hanson waived his right to a jury trial
and elected for a bench trial instead. (Tr. Vol. I, p.299, L.2–p.305, L.13.) The district court found
the State had proven Mr. Hanson’s prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.353, L.14–p.356, L.11; R., p.187.)
After the trial, Mr. Hanson retained private counsel. (R., pp.219–20.) In early January of
2008, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.363, L.1–p.381, L.14.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Hanson eight and one-half years, with two and one-half years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction (a “rider”). (Tr. Vol I, p.378, Ls.15–19,2 p.379, L.24–p.380, L.2.)
Mr. Hanson received credit for time served on the four misdemeanors. (Tr. Vol. I, p.380, L.16–
p.381, L.1.) The district court issued a Judgment – Retained Jurisdiction on January 22, 2008.
(R., pp.231–34; see also R., pp.235–38 (misdemeanor judgments).)
Mr. Hanson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.242–43.) On June 5, 2008, the Court
dismissed the appeal because Mr. Hanson did not pay the fees for preparation of the transcript
and record. (R., p.257.) About one week later, the district court held a rider review hearing and
placed Mr. Hanson on probation. (R., pp.258–59, 268–72.) Mr. Hanson again filed a timely
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.260–61.) The Court dismissed this appeal as well for the failure to pay
fees. (R., p.333.) In the intervening time between the notice of appeal and its dismissal, the
district court revoked Mr. Hanson’s probation and executed imposition of his sentence.
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At one point during sentencing, the district court referred to Mr. Hanson’s sentence as eight and
one-half years, with only two years fixed, but this appears to be a transcription error or an
inadvertent misstatement of the sentence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.378, Ls.6–9.)
3

(R., pp.321–22; Tr. Vol. I, p.471, Ls.5–9, p.472, Ls.7–8.) However, the district court reduced the
fixed portion of his sentence by one year, for a total sentence of eight and one-half years, with
one and one-half years fixed. (R., p.321; Tr. Vol. I, p.471, Ls.9–11, p.472, Ls.7–12.) The district
court issued a Judgment on Probation Violation on January 15, 2009. (R., pp.321–22.)
Mr. Hanson did not appeal from the probation revocation.
In late 2009, the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender was appointed to
represent Mr. Hanson on a pro se Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.337–39 (pro se Rule 35
motion), 355–57 (motion for appointment of counsel), 364 (appointment of counsel).) In 2011,
Mr. Hanson filed a second pro se Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.378–86 (second pro se Rule 35
motion), 405 (Rule 35 motion hearing minutes).) Ultimately, the district court denied the second
Rule 35 motion in June of 2011. (R., pp.406–12; see also Aug. R., pp.4–5 (discussion of Rule 35
motion proceedings).) Mr. Hanson did not appeal.
On August 17, 2011, the district court provided notice to the Office of the Kootenai
County Public Defender and the Kootenai County Prosecutor of its intent to destroy the exhibits
from the motion to suppress and jury trial. (R., pp.415–16; see also Aug. R., p.5.)
On April 19, 2012, Mr. Hanson filed a petition for post-conviction relief (CV 20123021). (Aug. R., p.5.) In the post-conviction case, Mr. Hanson (through a conflict public
defender) and the Kootenai County Prosecutor stipulated that Mr. Hanson “be allowed to pursue
his appeal previously dismissed for failure to pay transcription fees in the underlying criminal
case #06-14940 . . . .” (R., p.431.) In addition, the parties also stipulated, “the appeal shall be
considered timely if it would have been timely when originally filed prior to its dismissal for
non-payment of fees, and the State shall not object to the appeal on the basis of it currently being
untimely.” (R., p.432; see also Aug. R., pp.5–7 (discussion of post-conviction proceedings).) The
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district court issued an order for the re-entry of the judgment. (R., pp.434–35.) On July 15, 2013,
the district court issued an Amended Judgment on Probation Violation, nunc pro tunc
January 14, 2009. (R., pp.442–44.) The district court’s order in Mr. Hanson’s post-conviction
case for the re-entry of the judgment was also filed. (R., p.445.) On July 2, 2014, Mr. Hanson
moved for an amended re-entry of the judgment. (R., pp.460–61.) The State had no objection.
(R., pp.460–61.) On February 24, 2016, the district court issued a Judgment–Retained
Jurisdiction (Reentered). (R., pp.462–65.)
On March 2, 2016, Mr. Hanson filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s
reentered judgment. (R., pp.469–73.) Upon Mr. Hanson’s motion, this Court temporarily
remanded the case to the district court for further factual findings regarding the destroyed
exhibits. State v. Hanson, No. 44023, Order Granting Motion to Remand and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule (Oct. 28, 2016). On remand, the district court found (1) the exhibits had been
destroyed in compliance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 38; (2) Mr. Hanson had notice of
the district court’s intent to destroy the exhibits; (3) the exhibits could not be recreated and no
copies existed; (4) Mr. Hanson was not diligent in pursing this appeal; and (5) his failure to
diligently pursue the appeal contributed to (if not caused) the exhibits not to be retained. (Aug.
R., pp.8–13.) This Court reinstated the briefing schedule after the district court’s findings.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hanson’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hanson’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hanson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence

obtained from the police officer’s search of his vehicle. Specifically, he asserts he did not
voluntarily consent to the officer’s search because his consent was premised on the officer’s
coercive statement that the officer would search the vehicle irrespective of Mr. Hanson’s
consent. Due to the officer’s coercive claim of authority, Mr. Hanson’s consent was invalid.
Thus, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
After addressing the merits of this issue, Mr. Hanson turns to this Court’s review of the
issue in light of the record on appeal. The traffic stop video (Defendant’s Exhibit A) was
destroyed and unable to be recreated for the record on appeal. This video, however, is not
pertinent for review of the narrow consent issue presented by Mr. Hanson. As such, this Court
can engage in meaningful review, without presuming the video supports the district court’s
action and construing it against Mr. Hanson.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). “The Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570. The Court exercises free
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review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney,
153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hanson’s Motion To Suppress Because
Mr. Hanson Did Not Voluntarily Consent To The Search
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on
probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003)
(citations omitted). In general, the State bears the burden to show the warrantless search falls
within a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Halen v.
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).
Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Smith,
144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006). “It is the State’s
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than
the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied.” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97. This has also been
described as “a heavy burden to prove that the consent was given freely and voluntarily.” State v.
Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–
49 (1968)).
“A voluntary decision is one that is ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker.’ An individual’s consent is involuntary, on the other hand, ‘if his will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’” Jaborra, 143 Idaho
at 97 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). To determine whether an
individual’s will was overborne in a particular case, “the court must assess ‘the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
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interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226). “In examining all the surrounding
circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of
subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229; accord, e.g., State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852
(2001); State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011). Factors pertaining to the
subjective state of the person who consents include “lack of education,” “low intelligence,” and
“the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226. Additional
factors to determine voluntariness include: (a) the number of officers involved in the
confrontation; (b) the location and conditions of the consent, such as the time of day; (c) if the
police retained the individual’s identification; (d) whether the individual was free to leave; and
(e) whether the individual knew of his right to refuse consent. Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.
One factor that weighs heavily against—or, in some cases, completely invalidates—
consent is “an express or implied false claim by the police that they can immediately proceed to
make the search in any event.” 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE § 8.2(a) (5th ed.

2016) (footnotes omitted); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.10(b) (4th
ed. 2016) (same). For example, the police’s representation “that they presently have a warrant
renders consent involuntary because acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not voluntary
consent.” State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007). As explained by the United States Supreme
Court in Bumper:
A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the
basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. The result can be no
different when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the
validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any warrant at
all. . . . When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.
The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where
there is coercion there cannot be consent.
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391 U.S. at 548–50 (footnotes omitted). Likewise, the police’s claim “under government
authority” that they “had come to search,” Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315, 317 (1921),
or a claim “under color of their police authority” that they are “going to search,” Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12, 16–17 (1948), also invalidates consent. “Any other rule would
undermine ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ and
would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government,
where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the law.” Id. at 17.
Moreover, a false, erroneous, or baseless representation by police regarding their ability
to obtain a warrant weighs against a finding of voluntariness. Smith, 144 Idaho at 489; see also
State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118–19 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the police gain information
from an unlawful search, and then inform the defendant that they would obtain a warrant based
on that information, the defendant’s consent to search is undermined by the police’s
misrepresentation. Tietsort, 145 Idaho at 118–19. On the other hand, if the police accurately and
truthfully represent that they could or will obtain a search warrant (based on probable cause from
lawfully obtained information), then the defendant’s consent is not the result of a coercive
situation. See, e.g., Smith, 144 Idaho at 489–90; State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 863 (Ct. App.
2001). In sum, the police’s “threat to take unlawful or improper action cuts against
voluntariness,” but “merely explaining the options” is permissible. Smith, 144 Idaho at 489.
In this case, Officer Smith saw a Chevy El Camino driving with a broken tail light.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.3, Ls.2–13, p.4, Ls.13–19.) It was approximately 10:45 p.m. (Tr. Vol. III, p.3,
L.13.) Officer Smith followed the car, and he observed that the car’s license plate tabs were
expired and it was unregistered. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, L.20–p.5, L.4.) Officer Smith activated his
overhead emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. III, p.5, Ls.5–8.) As he was
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pulling the car over, he saw furtive movements. (Tr. Vol. III, p.5, Ls.13–22.) The driver and sole
occupant of the car, later identified as Mr. Hanson, was reaching down, in between, and behind
his seat up until Officer Smith approached him. (Tr. Vol. III, p.5, Ls.13–25, p.6, Ls.5–7.) Officer
Smith also saw that Mr. Hanson was very nervous. (Tr. Vol. III, p.7, L.8.) He first asked
Mr. Hanson what he was hiding or playing with, and Mr. Hanson gave him inconsistent answers.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.7, Ls.5–11.) Officer Smith then directed Mr. Hanson out of the car. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.7, Ls.12–18.) The car door was left open. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15, L.10, p.26, Ls.24–25.) Mr. Hanson
agreed to a pat down for weapons. (Tr. Vol. III, p.7, Ls.12–21.) Mr. Hanson had no weapons on
him. (Tr. Vol. III, p.7, Ls.22–23.)
Next, Officer Smith began to question Mr. Hanson about his identification, the car, and
what he was hiding under the seat. (Tr. Vol. III, p.7, L.24–p.9, L.13.) About three minutes after
the pat down search, Officer Smith asked Mr. Hanson, “What’s under the seat, you might as well
tell me, I’m gonna go look.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, L.25–p.14, L.7, p.26, Ls.21–22 (emphasis
added).3) Mr. Hanson told him that it was his cellphone, which was one of the answers he
initially gave Officer Smith. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.7–10.) Then, according to the district court’s
findings, “the conversation goes off on a tangent and they go on talking about it.” (Tr. Vol. II,

3

Initially, the district court stated Officer Smith said, “what’s under the seat? I’m gonna go
look.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.6–7.) Later on, during its factual findings and legal conclusions, the
district court stated:
In this particular case, I don’t know that I need to go there because at least in this
Court’s view of the tape that I was provided and the audible – what I could hear
and what I understand to be the record here, I don’t – I do not find that the
officer’s comment to the defendant with regard to going – gonna go look – what I
have down, “what’s under the seat, you might as well tell me, I’m gonna go look,”
in the total context of what was going on was not a false and erroneous statement.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.26, Ls.15–24.)
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p.14, Ls.10–12.) Another three minutes later, Officer Smith asks Mr. Hanson, “Do you care if I
search your car?” (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.13–21.) The district court found Mr. Hanson’s response
from the traffic stop video was somewhat inaudible, but he said “something about not my car.4”
(Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.21–22.) Officer Smith commented to Mr. Hanson, “Well, you know, you’re
driving, that’s why I’m asking you.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.23–24.) Mr. Hanson’s next response
was inaudible on the video, without any telling body language, but, nonetheless, the district court
found Mr. Hanson consented to the search. (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, L.24–p.15, L.6, p.29, L.23–p.30,
L.11.) In finding consent, the district court based its determination primarily on Officer Smith’s
preliminary hearing testimony that Mr. Hanson gave consent. (Tr. Vol. II, p.30, Ls.7–11; see also
Tr. Vol. III, p.9, Ls.14–22, p.38, Ls.8–19.)
Mr. Hanson contends the district court erred by determining he voluntarily consented to
the search of the vehicle. Officer Smith’s assertion that he was “gonna go look” under the seat
invalidated Mr. Hanson’s subsequent consent to search the car. As explored above, an officer’s
claim “under color of his office and of the law which he personifies” that he was going to search
or had come to search is implicitly coercive. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13, 16–17; see also Bumper,
391 U.S. at 550; Amos, 255 U.S. at 317. The officer “announces in effect that the occupant has
no right to resist the search.” Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550. As a result, any consent is “granted in
submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional
right.” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13. That is exactly what occurred here. Officer Smith told
Mr. Hanson that he was going to search anyways, so Mr. Hanson had no right to resist.
Mr. Hanson’s consent to search was a submission to Officer Smith’s authority, rather than a

4

The district court also concluded Mr. Hanson had standing to challenge the search. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.29, Ls.9–22, p.32, Ls.12–22, p.33, Ls.3–21.)
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voluntary waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Smith, 144 Idaho at 488 (“acquiescence to
a claim of lawful authority is not voluntary consent”).
Unlike situations where the police officer could obtain a warrant or had some other
grounds for a warrantless search, Officer Smith had no lawful justification to assert he could
search Mr. Hanson’s car. First, it is undisputed that Officer Smith did not presently have a
warrant to search the car. Second, Officer Smith did not have probable cause to search the car
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho
703, 706 (2012) (“[T]he automobile exception . . . allows police to search a vehicle without a
warrant when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a
crime.”)). “Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at the time of the search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. Here,
Officer Smith initiated the stop for reasonable suspicion of traffic violations: the broken tail light
and expired license tags/unregistered vehicle. During the time leading up to Officer Smith’s
search, Mr. Hanson made furtive movements while pulling the car over, was very nervous,5 and
gave somewhat evasive answers. These are the only facts weighing towards a determination of
probable cause to search the car for evidence of a crime. The majority of the information cuts the
other way: Officer Smith did not see Mr. Hanson commit any other traffic violations (like

5

A person’s nervous demeanor during an encounter with law enforcement “is of limited
significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion” “because it is common for
people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of
criminal activity.” State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285–86 (Ct. App. 2005). This reasoning
applies with equal force to establishing probable cause, which is a more demanding standard
than reasonable suspicion. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Moreover, nervous
behavior, even considered together with other factors that could be indicative of criminal
activity, may not be sufficient to establish probable cause. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
507 (1983).
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swerving on the road), he did not smell alcohol or suspect any drug use, and he found no
weapons on Mr. Hanson during the pat down. (Tr. Vol. III, p.7, Ls.22–23, p.21, Ls.19–23.)
Moreover, Officer Smith testified that nothing “caught his attention” inside the car “prior to
asking for consent to search.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.10–13.) Based on the totality of the
circumstances known to Officer Smith at the time of the search, there was not a fair probability
of contraband or evidence of a crime in Mr. Hanson’s car. Indeed, these facts were wholly
insufficient to identify even the category of crime Mr. Hanson was suspected of committing, let
alone the type of contraband or evidence expected to be found in the car. In short, Officer Smith
used the traffic stop to embark on a fishing expedition “in the hope that something might turn
up.” See State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 252 (1990) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
605 (1975)) (unlawful arrest followed by confession was “fishing expedition”). Officer Smith
had no lawful basis to claim that he could search Mr. Hanson’s car without his consent.
Moreover, the district court erred in its focus on whether Officer Smith’s claim of
authority to search was “false and erroneous.” With respect to Officer Smith’s claim, the district
court reasoned:
I do not find that the officer’s comment to the defendant with regard to
going – gonna go look – what I have down, “What’s under the seat, you might as
well tell me, I’m gonna go look,” in the total context of what was going on not a
false and erroneous statement. I mean, you can see the open door there. The
officer – if the defendant says, for example, “Well, there’s my cell phone under
there, the officer could go and at least go up to the door and peek in and see if he
could see the cell phone under the seat. If he didn’t see the cell phone under the
seat, he could go back and talk to the defendant and say, “You said that there’s a
cell phone under there, I didn’t see a cell phone, what are you talking about?”
That’s totally speculative, but the point is that the statement that “I’m gonna go
look” in the context of this particular exchange, I’m not going to find that as being
a false and erroneous statement about the officer’s – if it were as [trial counsel]
characterizes it, and I understand an inference could be – I mean a legitimate
argument could be made. I understand [trial counsel’s] point, it’s not without
merit. I mean I understand the argument, but in this particular circumstance I
don’t believe that’s – it’s not the same as the officer actually saying, you know, I
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can go dig under that seat, root around all I want to, you might as well tell me
what’s under there because I’m going to go dig in and find it. I mean that’s
exaggerating but it’s not I am going to go search that car. It’s, I’m gonna go look,
you know, and the inference – I understand the argument and the point is that the
officer’s trying to convince the person that there’s no reason for him to not give
consent, I understand that. The argument’s – but on this – having watched the tape
and the way the exchange – I mean, I would agree that there’s kind of an
interrogation going on, but I don’t that find as being that – basically they’re
working on reasonably articulate suspicion. Looking into things, I don’t find that
unnecessarily coercive.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.19–p.28, L.7 (emphasis added).) The district court next found that there was
nothing particularly threatening, coercive, or overbearing about Officer Smith’s questioning.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.28, Ls.8–15.) The district court then returned to Officer Smith’s claim:
The, “I’m gonna go look” I understand could be interpreted one way or the other,
but in terms of this court finding that that was a false and erroneous statement by
the officer, I can’t find that because he could go up and look and could peer under
the seat and look around, and so it really wasn’t a false and erroneous statement,
so that means even if the false and erroneous statement by the officer were a
bright line test, I don’t need to – I don’t have to make that decision as to whether
or not it is a bright line test because I’m making the finding that – in this
particular statement, my fact finding is that that was not a false and erroneous
statement by this officer at that time with regard to what he could in fact do if he
chose to do that, so we’re – that’s a long-winded way of getting to the point that I
think I therefore have to evaluate the consent issue on the totality of the
circumstances.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.28, L.16–p.29, L.8 (emphasis added).) The district court went on to examine the
totality of the circumstances to conclude Mr. Hanson’s consent was voluntary. (Tr. Vol. II, p.29,
L.23–p.32, L.11.)
The district court’s reasoning on Officer Smith’s claim of authority to search was legally
incorrect for two reasons. First, Officer Smith could not “go up to the door and peek in” or “go
up,” “look,” and “peer under the seat and look around.” The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held even a minimal intrusion into a vehicle constitutes a search. 6 For example, in

6

The United States Supreme Court has adopted a similar rule for intrusions into the home:
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New York v. Class, the United States Supreme Court held an officer conducted a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he momentarily reached into the car’s interior to
move papers obscuring the vehicle identification number (“VIN”) on the dashboard. 475 U.S.
106, 108, 111, 114–18 (1986). The United States Supreme Court took care to explain that the
intrusion was not the officer’s viewing of the VIN itself (which is not protected under the Fourth
Amendment), but rather his actual invasion into the car’s air space: “While the interior of an
automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one’s
home, a car’s interior as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable intrusions by the police.” Id. at 114–15. The Court of Appeals also recognized this
“clear distinction”—merely viewing a VIN is not a search, but an actual physical intrusion into
the vehicle is. State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 401 (Ct. App. 2007). Years later, in United
States v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held the government conducted a search within
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the police installed a GPS device on a vehicle.

The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. . . . [W]e made
clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, “by even a fraction
of an inch,” was too much . . . and there is certainly no exception to the warrant
requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees
nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this
principle in Jardines, holding the police’s physical intrusion on the front porch of a home to use
a drug dog constitutes a search. 133 S. Ct. at 1417–18.
Consistent with these principles, this Court held an officer’s physical intrusion by
inserting her foot through the threshold to keep the door open constituted a search: “It was not
necessary for the officer’s entire body to cross the threshold in order to constitute an entry under
the Fourth Amendment. ‘[A]ny physical invasion of the structure of the home, by even a fraction
of an inch, [i]s too much.’” State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 822 (2004) (alterations in original
and internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37).
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U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). The United States Supreme Court had “no doubt that such a physical
intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted.” Id. The United States Supreme Court also highlighted the government’s
conduct in “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id. at
404. The United States Supreme Court later clarified in Florida v. Jardines that the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test to determine whether a search occurred is no substitute for “the
traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.” 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417
(2013). “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline . . . keeps easy cases easy.” Id.
“[W]hen the government gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected
areas,” “a search occurred.” Id.
Here, regardless of whether Officer Smith’s questioning of Mr. Hanson as a whole was
coercive, the claim of authority to “go look” was false and erroneous. As Class, Jones, Jardines,
and Metzger all establish, the Fourth Amendment prohibits invasions into the physical interior
space of a vehicle absent a warrant or other automobile exception. Officer Smith may have been
able to walk up to the very edge car door, peer through the windows, and shine a flashlight
inside, but he could not pass the “threshold” of the door and peer his head under the driver’s seat,
even if just for a moment. If Officer Smith was going to “gain[ ] a view of items as a direct result
of an intrusion into a place where a privacy interests exists,” the State must be able to justify the
intrusion “as lawful police policy.” Metzger, 144 Idaho at 401. As discussed above, Officer
Smith had no legal justification, such as a warrant or probable cause, to search Mr. Hanson’s car.
Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that Officer Smith’s claim of
authority to go look inside the vehicle would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
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Second, the word “look,” spoken by a police officer, has been interpreted to mean
“search” in consent cases. In State v. Silva, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s
finding that an officer’s request to “look through” a truck meant a search of the entire cab,
including under the floor mats. 134 Idaho 848, 853 (Ct. App. 2000).7 “The standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect’ consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). So, even if
Officer Smith only meant he would somehow attempt to look under the driver’s seat without
breaking the “threshold” of the car, the question is what a reasonable person in Mr. Hanson’s
positon would have understood from Officer Smith’s claim. What Officer Smith could do or
what he believed he was telling Mr. Hanson he could do is entirely irrelevant. What matters is a
reasonable person’s understanding of Officer Smith’s claim of authority. The answer is clear.
When an officer pulls over a vehicle, at night, with emergency lights flashing, takes the person
out of the car, and then asks, “What’s under the seat, you might as well tell me, I’m gonna go
look,” that officer is going to search under the seat. Thus, the district court’s focus on how
Officer Smith might be able to or thought he would be able to lawfully “look” in the car was in

7

Although not binding authority, the Court of Appeals held a reasonable person would have
understood an officer’s request to “take a quick look” as a request to search the vehicle’s interior.
State v. Dias, No. 43495, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 725, 2016 WL 5864622, at *2–3
(Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2016) (citing United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 864, 867–69 (8th
Cir. 2010) (officer asked if there were drugs in the vehicle and if he could “look and see” if there
were drugs in the vehicle; court held the defendant’s unqualified consent gave the officer
permission to search the vehicle’s interior panels); United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139,
1142, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2002) (officer asked if there were drugs, contraband, or anything illegal
in the vehicle and if he could take a “quick look around” the vehicle; court held the defendant’s
unqualified consent gave the officer permission to search in the vehicle’s speakers)) .
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error. A reasonable person in Mr. Hanson’s position would have understood that Officer Smith
intended to search under the seat.
In summary, the district court erred by determining Mr. Hanson voluntarily consented to
the search of his car. Officer Smith’s claim of authority that Mr. Hanson “might as well” tell him
what was under the seat because he was “gonna go look” anyways invalidated Mr. Hanson’s
subsequent consent. “[A]cquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not voluntary consent.”
Smith, 144 Idaho at 488. Further, Officer Smith had no lawful basis (such as a warrant or
probable cause) to assert that he could search in the car. As such, Officer Smith was not “merely
explaining the options” to Mr. Hanson, but rather threatening to take “unlawful or improper
actions” because Officer Smith, in fact, could not pass the “threshold” of the car door. Id. at 489.
Finally, even if Officer Smith only intended to go up to, but not pass, the car’s “threshold,” a
reasonable person would not have understood his claim of authority in that way. A reasonable
person would have understood an intention to search under the seat. For these reasons,
Mr. Hanson contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

D.

This Court Has An Adequate Record To Review This Issue On Appeal, Even Without
The Traffic Stop Video
As a final matter, Mr. Hanson submits this Court has a sufficient record for meaningful

appellate review of the issue raised on appeal. Mr. Hanson does not challenge the district court’s
factual findings. There was no dispute below, and there is no dispute on appeal, regarding
Officer Smith’s “gonna go look” statement and Mr. Hanson’s subsequent consent. Rather,
Mr. Hanson challenges the district court’s legal conclusion of voluntary consent. Because
Mr. Hanson presents a question of law on appeal, the traffic stop video is not germane for this
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Court’s review. Therefore, Mr. Hanson asserts this Court has an adequate record to conduct
meaningful review of his assignment of error.
It is well established that the appellant has the burden to provide the Court with an
adequate record on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 888 (2000); State v. Beck,
128 Idaho 416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996). An adequate record is necessary for the Court to conduct
meaningful review of the assignments of error. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749 (Ct. App.
1997). “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [the
Court] will not presume error.” State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). However,
the record does not need to be complete for the Court’s review. State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 82
(1994) (addressing the merits of evidentiary error “to the extent possible” with an incomplete
record); Murphy, 133 Idaho at 491 (conducting meaningful review of sentencing error with court
minutes but no transcript). Only an adequate record to substantiate the appellant’s claims or
contentions is required. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 220 (2014); Murphy, 133 Idaho at 491.
Here, this Court can engage in meaningful review of the issue raised by Mr. Hanson on
appeal without the traffic stop video. As shown in Part C above, Mr. Hanson does not challenge
the district court’s factual findings regarding the traffic stop. He challenges the district court’s
legal conclusion that Officer Smith’s claim of authority to search the vehicle did not invalidate
Mr. Hanson’s consent. Indeed, most of the facts found by the district court are not relevant for
this Court’s review of this narrow issue. The most pertinent fact is the precise statement made by
Officer Smith prior to Mr. Hanson’s consent, and this fact is undisputed. Further, as discussed in
Part C, the district court found the traffic stop video to be largely inaudible, even stating at one
point that playing the video “probably wouldn’t do a lot of good anyway.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.13,
L.19–p.16, L.3, p.30, Ls.1–11.) Thus, the traffic stop video is not germane or necessary for
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review. The current record on appeal, which includes the hearings on the motion to suppress, the
district court’s oral factual findings and legal conclusions, and the preliminary hearing transcript,
is more than sufficient. Accordingly, this Court can meaningfully review this issue on appeal
without viewing the traffic stop video.
Further, the absence of the traffic stop video should not be construed against Mr. Hanson
on appeal. Missing portions of the record are presumed to support the trial court’s actions, but
only if those missing portions are germane or necessary to the appeal. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho
214, 220 (2014). For example, in Easley, the Court first determined that certain requested
transcripts were not relevant for review of the appellant’s assignment of error: whether the
district court abused its discretion by revoking the defendant’s probation. Id. at 218, 219–20. In
addition, the Court noted that the mere fact that the missing transcripts were “part of the whole
proceeding” to be reviewed by the Court did not, on its own, render the transcripts necessary for
effective appellate review. Id at 220. After the Court established that the transcripts were
unnecessary for meaningful review, the Court turned to the general presumption that missing
portions of the record are presumed to support the trial court’s decision. Id. The Court held that
this presumption was “not relevant to the appeal.” Id. That presumption “deals with ‘pertinent’
portions of the record that are excluded.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained that it
would “not engage in the inconsistency of determining that the transcripts are not germane to the
appeal but presumed to support the district court’s decision.” Id. Thus, the missing, non-pertinent
transcripts were not construed in favor of the district court’s ruling. Likewise, in Murphy, the
defendant challenged the district court’s denial of a motion on appeal, but failed to include a
transcript from the hearing on his motion in the appellate record. 133 Idaho at 491. The Court of
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Appeals determined that it “need not rely” on the presumption because the court minutes “are
such that meaningful review of [the defendant’s] claim is possible.” Id.
Similar to Easley and Murphy, meaningful review of Mr. Hanson’s claim is possible
without the traffic stop video. The traffic stop video is not a pertinent portion of the record. As
such, the absence of the traffic stop video should not be presumed to support the district court’s
ruling on the narrow consent issue raised on appeal. This Court has an adequate record for
review without construing the destroyed traffic stop video in support of the district court’s legal
conclusion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hanson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further
proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress and his judgment of conviction and remand this case for a
new suppression motion hearing.
DATED this 10th day of July, 2017.
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JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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